

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MADRID 07209 01 OF 02 221344Z

53

ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 SAM-01

CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 ACDA-07 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

/054 W

----- 007989

O 221243Z SEP 76

FM AMEMBASSY MADRID

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7234

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

CNO WASHDC

CINCEUR IMMEDIATE

CINCUSNAVEUR IMMEDIATE

USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MADRID 7209

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, MNUC, SP

SUBJECT: NPW VISITS TO SPANISH PORTS

REF: A) MADRID 7190 B) MADRID 7191 (DTG 211642Z SEP)

1. FOREIGN MINISTER OREJA LUNCHEd PRIVATELY WITH ME SEPTEMBER 21 FOLLOWING THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION. TOWARD THE END OF OUR TWO AND ONE-HALF HOUR CONVERSATION, OREJA SAID HE WISHED TO RAISE WITH ME THE PROPOSED VISIT OF USS NIMITZ TO GIBRALTAR. HE SAID THAT SHORTLY AFTER I HAD SEEN THE NAVY MINISTER (REFS A AND B), THE LATTER HAD CALLED HIM TO EXPRESS CONCERN OVER THE PROJECTED VISIT OF NIMITZ TO GIBRALTAR. OREJA SAID THAT HE CONSIDERED THIS A SERIOUS MATTER IN LIGHT OF THE SPANISH POSITION REGARDING GIBRALTAR. HE BELIEVED THAT SOME IMPROVEMENT IN THE GENERAL SITUATION WITH THE UK ON GIBRALTAR HAD TAKEN PLACE, BUT HE FEARED THAT A VISIT BY NIMITZ TO GIBRALTAR WOULD BE PROVOCATIVE TO THE RIGHT WING IN SPAIN AND WOULD CAUSE UNNECESSARY DIFFICULTIES FOR THE GOVERN-

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MADRID 07209 01 OF 02 221344Z

MENT AT THIS DIFFICULT MOMENT IN POLITICAL REFORM.

MOREOVER, THE PRESS AND OTHERS WOULD DRAW SOME CONNECTION BETWEEN THE KING'S VISIT TO THE NIMITZ AND THE VISIT TO GIBRALTAR. OREJA TOLD ME THAT THE KING'S VISIT TO THE NIMITZ HAD NOT BEEN VERY POPULAR IN SOME QUARTERS, PARTICULARLY THE OPPOSITION, BECAUSE OF THE NIMITZ'S NUCLEAR PROPULSION. A FURTHER NEGATIVE FACTOR WOULD BE THAT THE VIST OF NIMITZ TO GIBRALTAR WOULD TAKE PLACE SO SOON AFTER THE TREATY CAME INTO FORCE AND AT ABOUT THE TIME THE MINISTER WOULD BE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY IN WASHINGTON, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE US-SPANISH COUNCIL.

2. I TOLD OREJA THAT HIS COMMENTS CAME AS NO GREAT SURPRISE TO ME, ALTHOUGH I HAD BEEN INTERESTED THAT THE NAVY MINISTER'S REACTION TO WHAT I HAD TOLD HIM HAD BEEN RATHER LOW-KEYED. I TOLD HIM THAT WE CERTAINLY HAD NO DESIRE TO MAKE THE TASK OF THE GOVERNMENT MORE COMPLICATED AT THIS STAGE BUT THAT I FAILED TO UNDERSTAND WHY THER SHOULD BE SUCH A STIR. FOR ONE THING, THE VISIT WOULD TAKE PLACE SOME SIX WEEKS OR MORE AFTER THE KING HAD VISITED THE NIMITZ AND THEREFORE NO DIRECT RELATIONSHIP COULD RIGHTFULLY BE DRAWN. I THEN SAID THAT IT WAS NECES- SARY TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE NIMITZ AND ITS ACCOMPANYING SHIPS WERE IN THE MEDITERREAN IN THE OVERALL INTEREST OF WESTERN DEFENSE, WHICH INCLUDED SPAIN. THEY WERE NOT HERE SOLELY FOR U.S. PURPOSES NOR INDEED FOR ANY- BODY'S PARTICULAR PLEASURE. WITH 6000 MEN ABOARD NIMITZ, IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE SCHEDULED REGULAR SHORE LEAVES. SOME HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE IN MOROCCO AND OTHERS IN ITALY, BUT THESE SHIPS COULD NOT BE INDEFINITELY KEPT AT SEA WITHOUT PROPER FACILITIES FOR REST AND RECREATION OF THE CREW. NIMITZ WOULD BE ENGAGED IN MANEUVERS IN SOUTHERN WATERS SEPTEMBER 29 AND 30 AND AFTER A LONG PERIOD AT SEA, CREW REST WAS AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT. IF INDEED THESE SHIPS, WHOSE SAFETY RECORD HAD BEEN PERFECT OVER MANY YEARS, COULD VISIT SPANISH PORTS, THEN A WHOLE NEW SITUATION WOULD ARISE. HOWEVER, SINCE THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT WAS CON- TINUING TO STUDY THE PROBLEM, AND I UNDERSTOOD THE NEED

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MADRID 07209 01 OF 02 221344Z

FOR CAREFUL STUDY, THEN SPANISH PORTS ARE NOT AVAILABLE AND GIBRALTAR WAS. I RECALLED TO OREJA OUR NEUTRAL STAND ON THE GIBRALTAR ISSUE AND THAT TO KEEP NIMITZ OUT OF GIBRALTAR BECAUSE OF SPANISH OBJECTIONS WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH OUR NEUTRAL STAND.

3. I TOLD OREJA THAT I, OF COURSE, WOULD BE WILLING TO REPORT HIS EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN BUT BEFORE DOING SO

I REALLY WANTED TO KNOW JUST HOW STRONGLY THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT FELT. I TOLD HIM THAT IN VIEW OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE FROM THE MORALE POINT OF VIEW FOR THE CREW TO HAVE SHORE LEAVE, I WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO MAKE ANY RECOMMENDATION ABOUT THE GIBRALTAR VISIT WITHOUT KNOWING THAT THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT HAD INDEED CONSIDERED THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM AND IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MUTUAL INTEREST BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES HAVE IN SIXTH FLEET OPERATIONS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MADRID 07209 02 OF 02 221352Z

53

ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 SAM-01

CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 ACDA-07 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

/054 W

----- 008111

O 221243Z SEP 76

FM AMEMBASSY MADRID

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7235

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

CNO WASHDC IMMEDIATE

CINCEUR IMMEDIATE

CINCUSNAVEUR IMMEDIATE

USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MADRID 7209

4. OREJA LISTENED CAREFULLY TO WHAT I SAID AND THEN ASKED ME NOT TO RAISE THE MATTER WITH WASHINGTON AS YET. HE ASKED ME WHEN NIMITZ WAS SCHEDULED TO GO INTO GIBRALTAR AND I TOLD HIM AROUND OCTOBER 1. HE SAID HE WOULD SPEAK TO THE PRIME MINISTER TO SEE WHETHER ANYTHING COULD BE DONE TO PERMIT VISITS TO SPANISH PORTS AND ASKED ME TO CALL HIM NO LATER THAN FRIDAY IF HE HAD NOT CALLED ME BEFOREHAND.

5. SEVERAL HOURS AFTER THE ABOVE CONVERSATION, I HAD OCCASION TO SPEAK TO OREJA AGAIN. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN WITH BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND

MINISTER OF NAVY. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT DOMESTIC REACTION TO THE VISIT AND ALSO WAS MOST TROUBLED THAT THE VISIT WOULD BE TAKING PLACE AT THE SAME TIME AS THE US-SPANISH COUNCIL WOULD BE MEETING IN WASHINGTON. THE NAVY MINISTER HAD TOLD OREJA THAT HE WAS EXPECTING SHORTLY TO RECEIVE INFORMATION HE HAD REQUESTED FROM THE U.S. NAVY TO ASSIST HIM IN MAKING A RECOMMENDATION ON NPW VISITS TO THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT. IN THE MEANTIME, SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MADRID 07209 02 OF 02 221352Z

HE PROPOSED THAT IF NIMITZ STAYED OUTSIDE TERRITORIAL WATERS, THEN SHORE LEAVE VISITS BY THE CREW TO MALAGA COULD BE ARRANGED. I TOLD OREJA THAT THE NAVY MINISTER'S PROPOSAL WAS IMPRACTICABLE IN VIEW OF THE DISTANCE INVOLVED IN TRANSPORTING THE CREW AND COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A REASONABLE SOLUTION.

6. OREJA AGAIN REITERATED HIS CONCERN AND ASKED THAT I KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE NAVY MINISTER ABOUT THE PROBLEM. I MADE NO COMMITMENT, BUT ONCE AGAIN STRESSED THE NEED FOR NIMITZ TO HAVE ACCESS TO PORTS FOR SHORE LEAVE PURPOSES.

7. COMMENT: THE GIBRALTAR VISIT OF NIMITZ HAS CREATED AN AWKWARD SITUATION AS WE KNEW IT WOULD WHEN THE MATTER FIRST CAME UP. I HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION, AND STILL DO, THAT I UNDERSTAND THE NAVY'S NEED FOR THE GIBRALTAR VISIT BUT THAT IT SHOULD BE EQUALLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE VISIT WILL COMPLICATE MY EFFORTS TO WORK OUT NPW VISITS TO SPANISH PORTS. I DO NOT DOUBT THAT THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT WILL PURSUE THE GIBRALTAR QUESTION WITH ME, BUT MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT WE HOLD FAST AND MAINTAIN THE PRINCIPLE THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT INTERFERENCE IN LEGITIMATE SIXTH FLEET OPERATIONS. OBVIOUSLY IT IS IMPORTANT THAT U.S. NAVY BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE IN PROVIDING INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SPANISH NAVY MINISTRY ON NPWS TO ASSIST THEM IN MAKING A RECOMMENDATION TO THE GOVERNMENT, BUT I THINK WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT GIBRALTAR VISIT MAY SET US BACK IN THE EFFORTS TO OBTAIN SPANISH APPROVAL FOR VISITS TO SPANISH PORTS. IT IS ALSO LIKELY THAT IF THE VISIT TO GIBRALTAR DOES PROCEED, OREJA WILL RAISE THE QUESTION AT THE US-SPANISH COUNCIL MEETING.

8. IN SUM, IT IS MY FEELING THAT WE STAND FAST ON OUR PRESENT POSITION WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT POSSIBLE FALLOUT IN TERMS OF NPW VISITS TO SPAIN. STABLER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, VISITS, NAVAL SHIPS, USS NIMITZ
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 SEP 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: coburnhl
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976MADRID07209
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760357-1080
From: MADRID
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760933/aaaabbwg.tel
Line Count: 222
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION PM
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 76 MADRID 7190, 76 MADRID 7191
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: coburnhl
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 MAR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <09 MAR 2004 by morefirh>; APPROVED <07 SEP 2004 by coburnhl>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NPW VISITS TO SPANISH PORTS
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, MNUC, SP, US, (VEIGA, PITA DA), (OREJA)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006